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A Skeptical Note on the New Econometrics
ABSTRACT
One suggestion for coping with the Lucas critique of applied
econometric research is to estimate the taste and technology parameters
that presumably underlie supply and demand curves. Proponents of this
approach generally interpret economy-wide data on prices and quantities
as the results of optimization problems solved by representative con-
sumers and firms. Theoretical first-order conditions (normally linear)
for interior solutions are then used to convert observed data into
estimates of the taste and technology parameters of representative
agents.
This brief paper points to a hazard in this type of research.
Specifically, the new style of econometrics can lead to serious error
if the economy-wide data are not in fact generated by interior optima
of representative agents, but rather come from aggregating over agents
that behave quite differently.
In an example where the market-wide demand curve is smooth even
though each individual's demand function is a step function, the
procedures of the new econometrics are shown to lead to grievous
errors even though all consumers optimize and the econometrician is
assumed to know the precise form of the utility function. It is
argued that this example is of quite general applicability, and that







In an important paper published in 1976, Robert E. Lucas, Jr.
offered an insightful and stunning critique of what were then
standard econometric practices. The critique took the profession
by storm, and econometricians--or at least macro—econometricjans——
have been struggling with the problem of how to reconstruct
1 econometrics ever since.In this brief paper, I argue that one of
the major approaches that has been developed for dealing with the
Lucas critique may introduce errors of its own into econometric
estimates--errors that may well be more serious in practice than
those pointed to by Lucas.
The Old Econometrics and the Lucas Critique
I begin with an example that briefly characterizes theway
econometrics was done before Lucas, and illustrates why Lucas
(correctly) claimed that these procedures might lead to error.
Consider the problem of estimating a supply curve and a
demand curve for a single market, as depicted in Figure 1.
Econometricians used to conceptualize the inference problem as
follows. For each time period we have a pair of observations on
price and quantity xi), which we interpret as the intersection
of the demand curve D and the supply curve S (point E).
If there are one or more shift variables that affect the demand
curve but not the supply curve,and one or more shift variables
that affect the supply curve but not the demand curve, then
1The Lucas critique is justas applicable to microeconomics
as to macroeconomics. However, it seems that mostly macro-




standard procedures can be used to estimate the slopes of these
two curves.
Why, apart from the general quest for knowledge, would we
want to estimate such parameters? There are many possible reasons.
One which seems germane to the issue raised by Lucas is that the
government might be considering regulating the supply of the
commodity, and would like to estimate the changes in price and
quantity that would result. The standard procedures in the "old
econometrics" would be to estimate the parameters of the demand
curve (say, by two stage least squares) and then use these estimates
to predict behavior. Essentially, this amounts to extrapolating
past patterns of behavior into the future.
Enter the Lucas critique. Lucas argued, quite correctly,
that the supply and/or demand curves observed in the past might
change if there were a change in the economic environment (e.g.,
in government policy). For example, suppose a demand curve had
been estimated on data from a period during which the government
set the price exogenously, and the econometric estimate was:
(1) x =a-bpt
+cy
where y is income. But suppose the estimate of breally
combined the true demand slope and anexpectational parameter.
For example, suppose the "true" demandcurve was:
(2) x — + + +
where denotes the (rational) expectation of next period's3.
price. If prices during the period of observation had followed
the stochastic process:
Pt =A+ +
where is a white noise error term, then the (rational)
expected future price would be ,leadingto the observed
demand rule:
(1t) x a —(1—i32)A
— — + Ityt +
Comparing (L) with (1), we see that a and b are really estimates of
and 1—P2, respectively, and therefore should change if
the stochastic process generating prices changes. The upshot of this
observation is that the estimates of a and b derived from the historical
data might be inappropriate if the policy rule changes. Put differently,
extrapolations of past demand behavior might systematically err.
The New Econometrics
Several approaches have been suggested for dealing with
the Lucas critique. One is to introduce directly observedexpectational
variables intoour equations, rather than using standard observable
variables to 'Tproxy" expectations (as, for example,Pt proxied
in part for tt+l is in this spirit that several scholars
have suggested estimating investment spending as a function of
?TTobin?s qT' rather than as a function of directly observed
variables such as interest rates and tax parameters?I take this
'See Abel (1980),. Blanchard (1980), or Summers (1981).LI.
tobe the best possible approach where it is feasible. Unfortunately,
most expectational variables are not directly observed.
A second approach is to impose, in estimation, the cross—
equation constraints suggested by rational expectations.' For
example, we could try to estimate jointly equations (2) and (3),
taking account of the fact that =
Athird approach, and the one I want to take issue with here,
is to go "beyond demand and supply curves" (in Sargent's (1982)
words) and try to estimate the taste and technology parameters
that, according to neoclassical equilibrium theory, underlie them.2
As I interpret this third approach, the suggestion is no longer
to think of our data as coming from Figure l's supply and demand
curves, but rather as coming from Figure 2, where I depict an
indifference curve for the representative consumer and a trans-
formation curve for the representative firm. Here we see the
consumer's and the producer's choices between two goods, x1
_1.___ -.-,4 •-1.- ,-.. '..WILLWLL LIIiiU11Lei..Li1"'2
'L1LLLLLVpiJ..L. ,
appears as the slope of the tangent line at point E. Whereas in
the old econometrics we would have taken data on x2. and Pt
and tried to estimate the slopes of the supply and demand curves,
the new econometrics tries to use these same data to estimate the
slopes of the indifference and transformation curves--the "taste
and technology parameters."
1For an example,see Taylor (1979).
21t should be pointed out that the threeapproaches are by
no means mutually exclusive.The program of the new econometrics isbeyond reproach in
principle. The issue is whether or notwe can really expect to
carry it out successfully. What are some of the pitfallsof which
we must beware? To be specific, I will focuson one particular
class of reasons why the methods advocatedby Hansen and Sargent
(1980) and others may errsystematically__and by gross amounts.
The reason is quite simple andgeneral: much of the time
series data we get on prices andquantities may not reflect
neoclassical equilibria of the sortdepicted in Figure 2. Two
instances seem to me to be ofgreat empirical importance. First,
many of the price—quantity combinationswe observe may reflect
disequilibrja rather than equilibria.it is by now well known
that imposing the (false)hypothesis of equilibrium in suchcases
may, but need not always, lead to grievous errors.1 Second,
many of the equilibria attained by even rational and well-informed
optimizing agents may be corners rather than nice tangencies such
as point E in Figure 2. The next section illustrates this problem
with a specific example, and suggests that the errors introduced
by forcing the data into the Procrustean bed of Figure 2 might be
enormous.
An Example
Consider a consumer allocating his total income,y ,between
two goods. x1isthe numeraire and isinfinitelydiviib1e.
has a price of p ,butconsumers can only choose between buying
1See Rosen and Quandt (1978) foran example.Sa.6.
it (x21) or not buying it (x2O). Therearemany examples of
goods that x2 might represent, and I think the general
phenomenon is very important. For many g'ods, the primary reason
for a downward sloping market demand curve may be that more people
drop out of the market as the price rises, not that each individual
consumer reduces his purchases. (Think, for example, of books,
1
furniture, cars, houses, movie tickets.) Another important aDplication
might be labor supply, with x2 interpreted as thofraction of time
devoted to leisure and p interpreted as the real wage.
The consumer's "budget constraint" is:
(5) x1 +px2y
but his only real choice is between (x2O, x1=y) and
(x2=l, x1y—p).
(I assume y >pto make this problem meaningful.)
To create a simple example, assume that every consumer has
a Stone-Geary utility function:
(6) U(x1,x2)log(l+x1) +cdog(1+x2)
where a is a taste parameter that differs across individuals.
The consumer's optimization problem is easily solved, but not
'Clearly the length of the period is critical here. If we
take the lifetime as the time unit, then discrete purchases are
probably not terribly important for most commodities. But the
data we work with are generally monthly, quarterly or annual. Over
these time periods., discrete choice is rrobably quite important.
Some of the relevant theory is displayea in Novshek and
Sonnenschein (1979).7.
by calculus. If he buys x2 ,hisutility is:
log(l +y-p)+alog(2)
whereas if he does not buyx2 ,hisutility is:
log(l+y)
He therefore will buyx2 if and only if:
(7) >log(l+y)-log(l+y—p)
log2
To generate a downward-sloping market demand curve from the
individual demand curves that are step functions, define the
righthand side of (7) as a ,whichdepends on y and P. To keep
the example simple, assume that y is the same foreveryone, and let




where F() is the cumulative distribution function corresponding to
f(•). Notice that the price and income derivatives of the demand
function are:






where I have used the definition of cx*(p,y) in taking the
derivatives. The market diiiand function is thus well behaved: it
is increasing in income and decreasing in price.
What would an econometrician practicing the new econometrics
do in this case? So as not to becloud the issue, assume
that he gets the utility function exactly right.1 His only
error, I assume, is that he mistakenly interprets the market
demand curve as a blowup of the individual demand curve of a
representative consumer, not realizing that x2 is available
only in discrete amounts. That is, he erroneously interprets
the price and quantity data as reflecting tangencies between
indifference curves and budget lines as in Figure 2.
The hypothetical representative consumer would then maximize:
log(l+X1) +alog(l+X2)





Following the program suggested by Sargent and others, he would
then use data on y, p, and X2 along with equation (9) to
ihfer the value of the taste parameter a.What would he get?
1.
This, of course. is an unwarranted assumption, and suggests
an additional source of error. But getting the funtional form
right is always a problem in any style of econometric work.9.
It is convenient to define a synthetic variable:
1+yt (10) Z =
Pt
Then (9) can be written as the simple linear regression:
(9') +1A(Z +1)
where AaI(l+a). The ordinary least squares estimator of
this single parameter has probability limit:
cov(X2,Z) (11) plim A
2
Let us assume that the true model is as indicated earlier,
and that it holds without error. A computationally convenient
case arises when the tase parameter ci.has the following
exponential density:
-Act
f(ct) Xe ct >0 ,
withA log2. (So the mean of is l/(log2) l.L4.)In
this case, it turns out that the true demand curve, equation (8),
has the simple form:
(8') 1 —
t
where Z is defined in (10). From (8'), the
covariance needed for (11) is seen to be:
cov(X2,Z) =E()
-1
which is necessarily positive by Jensen's inequality.
To take this calculation further ,usethe
second-order Taylor series approximation for lizaroundthe point
Z =, viz.:





sothat (11) becomes simply:
(11') plim A 12
(Z)
This would be the estimated "slope" of the demand curve
with respect to Z derived by the procedures of the new
econometrics. It is to be compared with the true slope which,
according to (8') is:
(12)
At the mean Z (which is not the mean y and p ),these
slopes are equal. But at a value of Z that is, say, twice
the mean—-which is not at all unusual in time series data—-the
estimated slope would be four times too large. Huge errors
seem likely.
Notice also that the econometric procedures based on the
false assumption of interior maxima badly distort the shape of
the true demandfunction. For example, the estimated demand













Figure 3 charts the actual and estimated demand curves as a
function of Z in the case of 2 (which corresponds to A
In this example, which I do not believe is contrived in
any sense except, of course, its reliance on discrete choice,
the potential errors in pursuing the new econometrics are
enormous. It would take a lot of persuasion——andsome
evidence--to convince me that theproblem isolated by Lucas
typically leads to errors of this magnitude.
Two responses can be made to thisexample. The first notes
that my example is just a case of specificationerror, and everyone
knows that misspec±ficatjon can lead to badestimates. For
example, if the econometrician understood the discrete natureof
the choice problem, he would have estimated (8')instead of (9) and
would not have made a mistake.
Naturally, this is so. I presume that maximum likelihood
estimation of the correct model always leads to thebest estimates;
the trick is to find the correct model.My point is that the particular
procedures advocated by the new econometricians invariably view the
data as being generated by interior solutions tooptimization
problems solved by representative individuals and firms.My
example shows that, if this view of the world iswrong, huge errors
can result. I claim further that discrete choice and differences
in tastes are pervasive phenomena,so the example is not some














Twoexamples are worth mentioning in this context.(I am sure
there are many others.) The first has to do with taste parameters.
Christensen, Jorgenson, and Lau (1975) used a very flexible functional
form, but still rejected the hypothesis that the aggregate data
could have been generated as the solution to a utility maximization
problem. The second involves technology parameters. Blinder (1981)
showed thatthe (S,s) model of inventory behavior can be aggregated
to lead to an equation that looks just like a stock adjustment model.
In the stock adjustment interpretation, of the equation, which can
be derived from a linear-quadratic structure similar to that used
by Hansen and Sargent the coefficient on the initial inventory stock
reflects certain "technology parameters." However, under the (S,s)
interpretation of the same equation, this coefficient arises from
the aggregation process and has nothing whatsoever to do with
technology. If the (S,s) model is true, the procedures of the new
econometrics would mistakenly "identify" the "technology parameters"
of a quadratIc cost functIon when, in fact, no such functIon exIsts.
The second response recalls that the advantage of having an
estimator which is immune to the Lucas critique only comes to the
fore when there is a regime change. If the environment remains the
same, then even reduced form parameters passing themselves off as
"structural" will be invariant. But only taste and technology
parameters will remain invariant in the face of large changes in
regime.
'See Blinder (1982).13.
I have two answers to this. First, it seems to me that we
rarely experience major, abrupt regime changes where Lucas—type
1 reasoning leads us to expect sudden, large changes in parameters.
For workaday econometrics, the kinds of estimation errors illustrated
by my example may be quite large relative to those introduced by
ignoring the Lucas critique.
Second, let us use the example to examine the chief selling
point of the new econometrics: that it can handle regime changes
better because it yields estimates of taste and technology parameters.
In the example, the taste parameters are summarized by an exponential
distribution of the taste parameter a,whosemean is 1/log2 1..
The new econometric procedures would yield a single taste parameter:
the "a" in the utility function of the representative consumer,
which it would use to predict behavior following a change of regime.
Since the point estimate of Aa/(l+a) has ()_2 as its
probability limit, the plim of a is:
1 plima= 2a)—l
Depending on the precise value of Z, this may or may not bear
much resemblance to the mean value of a in the population.
For example, in the 2 case depicted in Figure 3, plim a1/3,
which is less than one quarter of the true population mean!
1Sims (1982) shares this view.LLt.
Thereis thus no reason to think that the "taste and technology
parameters" derived from the new econometrics will be good guides
to what actually happens following a regime change (unless, of
course, we really get the model right).
In Conclusion
This short paper should not be misinterpreted as a brief
against rational expectations, nor even against imposing the cross-
equation constraints delivered by rational expectations in applied
econometric work. The criticisms of the old econometrics made by
Lucas, Sargent and others are not wrong; they are absolutely correct.
The paper is, however, a brief against the view that there is
any one "right way" to do econometrics. In statistical work with
dirty data, there is no room for purity and no such thing as a
free lunch. The applied econometrician who single—mindedly devotes
his energies to coping with the Lucas critique is likely to be
blind-sided by another problem.
Saying this in no way denies the validity of the Lucas critique,
but merely points out that it may not always be of great empirical
importance. In my view, the critique should take its place as one
among many serious problems that confront the applied econometrician
--on a par, perhaps, with violations of the assumptions of the Gauss—
Markov theorem. The realization, for example, that least squares
bias can always be present has not stopped applied econometrics
in its tracks (though it has given cause for humility). Perhaps
the Lucas critique should be treated in the same way.15.
Thisbroader perspective dictates that we follow amore
pragmatic, case by case, approach in which we recognize that other
problems may be more important than the Lucas critique in particular
cases. Certainly, there is no a priori reason to suppose that the
best econometric estimates are those that are most immune to the
Lucas critique if the procedures employed to deal with thecritique
introduce errors of their own.
Specifically, the example in this paper suggests that the new
econometrics--which views the world as composed of concaveconsumers
and concave firms that compute mathematical expectations and meet
atomistically in blissful equilibrium along separating hyperplanes--
is potentially fraught with error. Using these techniques togo
vrbeyorld supply and demand curves" to the taste and technology
parameters that presumably underlie them may be a high-risk
strategy. And in many cases we may conclude that, the Lucas critique
notwithstanding, extrapolating supply and demand curves based on
past behavior is the best technique we have for predicting the
future.16.
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